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The centenary of the 1916 Rising marks a time of peaceful commemoration, across 
the island of Ireland. However, several violent dissident republican groups wish to 
seize it as an opportunity to re-organise in an attempt to bolster and legitimise their 
sustained paramilitary campaign. This study seeks to provide a greater understanding, 
of how this paramilitary activity has manifested from 2007 to mid-2015. We do this 
by assessing target selection, through analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican 
(VDR) events database. The data suggest that civilian targets are the most regularly 
attacked. However, when exclusively analysing targets of detonated explosives, the 
data show that police, security personnel and their infrastructure are more consistently 
targeted. The target selected can and does have an effect on attack method. These 
findings can both assist in protecting the potential targets of VDR attacks and 
contribute to the development of a strong nationalised, and localised, counter VDR 
narrative.     
 




By late 2015 the future of the Northern Irish peace process had once again been called 
into question. On this occasion the supposed threat to stability and peace came in 
reaction to the alleged involvement of Provisional IRA (PIRA) members in the 
murder of their former comrade Kevin McGuigan, in the Short Strand, Belfast on 
August 12th, 2015.1 Many believe that McGuigan’s life was taken in retribution for 
the killing two months previously of another former Provisional, Gerard ‘Jock’ 
Davison.2 The murder, and reactions to it, raised significant concerns about the 
apparent continued existence of a movement thought inert. This apparent violent 
return of the ‘Provos’ to the Northern Irish social and political stage, gave rise to 
widespread speculation and condemnation in equal measure. However, nothing 
suggests this is anything more than a settling of old scores. There was no declaration 
of a resumption of the armed campaign, and no Provisional distancing from the wider 
political strategy of Sinn Féin (the political wing of the PIRA). In fact, Sinn Féin 
representatives were quick to condemn the violence.3 Even though, there continue to 
be allegations of ‘Provisional’ involvement in fuel smuggling, intimidation and wider 
criminality4 this, it appears, does not herald a permanent return to the paramilitary 
stage, and instead is simply characterized by the involvement of former figures in that 
movement, sometimes working together in small groups.5 
 
Meanwhile, as the political and media focus rested firmly on allegations of the 
Provisionals’ return, the more persistent threat to Northern Irish security of violent 
dissident republicanism6 (VDR) once again reared its ugly head. On the same day as 
the murder of McGuigan, a VDR bomb exploded on the Skeoge Road in Derry. Two 
days later, another, perhaps more significant, bomb exploded this time inside Palace 
Barracks, the Northern Irish base of both MI5 and The Royal Scots Borderers. The 
bomb was hidden inside a parcel in a Royal Mail postal van. It is believed that this 
was detonated remotely. While neither explosion inflicted any injuries or fatalities, 
both events illustrated the continuing intent of the VDR groupings to perpetuate an 
armed campaign that has been sporadically on-going since 1994. These two attacks 
should not be considered as wholly representative of VDR tactics. However, they 
illustrate the intention of the groups, to simultaneously target the security services of 
the state while also aiming to disrupt the normalisation of Northern Irish life, through 
their attacks on civilian targets across the country. The main purpose of this article is 
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to analyse how this modern day VDR activity has evolved; and in particular, to assess 
who and what have been the victims and targets of that violence.      
The Modern Wave of VDR Activity 
For many, the history of VDR activity is defined by the Omagh bombing, the Real 
IRA (RIRA) attack that took the lives of 29 civilians and injured over 200 others in 
August 1998. Since then, there has been no VDR atrocity on this scale. However, 
recent times have shown the ability, and intention, of a variety of groups to retain the 
utility of paramilitary force. A post St Andrews Agreement7 Northern Ireland, has 
seen each of the dominant VDR groups utilise lethal, or near lethal, force to further 
their stated aims, of achieving an independent 32 county socialist Ireland. This has 
seen the rise of several distinct VDR groups, including: RIRA, Óglaigh na hÉireann 
(ONH), the Continuity IRA (CIRA), Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and 
more recently ‘The IRA/New IRA.’ Each of these groups has engaged in a variety of 
paramilitary activities, ranging from the lethal targeting of the security services, to 
punishment attacks and murders of those they deem to be criminals (e.g. alleged drug 
dealers).  
 
We believe that the violence in present-day Northern Ireland is part of a modern wave 
of VDR activity, which dates back to January 2007. It was then that the Ard Fheis 
(the annual party conference) of Sinn Féin made the historical decision to support the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).8 This vote provided the cornerstone for 
sustained peace in the country. For generations, republican distrust in, and dismissal 
of, the police had played a significant role in holding back the complete normalisation 
of Northern Irish society. Prior to their full acceptance and support of the PSNI, Sinn 
Féin had historically told their supporters not to report any crimes or misdemeanours 
to the police, either the PSNI or their predecessors in the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC).9 This was due to the stated Republican belief that this was a British police 
force, whose very existence promoted the continued partition of Ireland. Historically 
for Irish Republican paramilitaries the PSNI, and the RUC, represented an 
‘occupying’, British and ‘political’ police force. For the Irish republicans, the police 
did not represent their community. The RUC especially, was framed as a 
predominantly Protestant and unionist sympathising police force, whose job it was to 
maintain the existence of partition.10 
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This inherent dismissal of the police provided the Republican Movement with the 
opportunity to present themselves as the legitimate protectors of the republican and 
nationalist communities. Resultantly, with the 2007 vote the VDR community took 
the opportunity to re-launch their semi-dormant campaign of paramilitary violence. 
To their potential and existing support and membership, they depicted the Sinn Féin 
leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness as ‘selling a lie,’ to the Northern 
Irish people. While Sinn Féin were promoting the PSNI as a civic police force, the 
Real IRA were accusing the ‘RUC/PSNI’ of being a ‘political police force whose 
primary function is to protect British interests in Ireland.’11 In doing so, they were 
stating that Sinn Féin had abandoned the Northern Irish republican community. 
 
The re-emergence of the VDR campaign was manifested in the targeting of PSNI 
officers. With the advent of the Patten Commission,12 and the origins of the PSNI, one 
of the central aims was to create a more representative police force, and to enforce a 
50-50 recruitment strategy for Protestant and Catholic candidates. If successful, it 
would become significantly more difficult for the VDR groups to characterise the 
police as being unrepresentative. Consequently, in addition to targeting the PSNI 
because of the ‘enemy’ status, the groups have also specifically targeted Catholic and 
nationalist officers. This has resulted in the murder of officers Stephen Carroll13 and 
Ronan Kerr,14 by the CIRA and ‘The IRA/New IRA’ respectively. These officers, and 
their colleagues, have been targeted so as to deter others of a similar background from 
joining; in doing so, they seek to maintain the status quo of an unrepresentative force. 
This in turn, allows the groups to sustain and legitimise their own position as 
community protectors, distinct from the police. Recent figures show that, while more 
representative than before, that the percentage of Roman Catholic police officers in 
the force is 30.97% in comparison to 67.02% Protestant officers.15 At the time of the 
last census, in 2011, 40.76% of all Northern Irish citizens stated that they were 
Catholic and 45.14% were brought up in a Roman Catholic household. In contrast 
41.56% stated that they were Protestant, or of other Christian religions, and 48.36% 
were brought up in a Protestant or other Christian religion household.16 While this 




Alongside the threat posed by the VDR groups to their declared enemy, the British 
state and their security services, VDR attacks also regularly threaten the wider civilian 
population. This has included the attempted detonation of explosive devices in 
residential and shopping areas across Northern Ireland.17 The main function of these 
attacks is to disrupt the normalisation of life in post-Troubles Northern Ireland and in 
turn harm inward social and economic investment in the state. Their aim is to 
demonstrate that the future of Northern Ireland is unsustainable, if it remains part of 
the United Kingdom. 
 
These attacks on the police and security services, as well as the targeting of the 
broader civilian population, have been complimented by a parallel strategy to 
‘protect’ the republican and nationalist communities, from drug dealers and other 
anti-social elements. This stated tactic has seen the murders of individuals such as 
Andrew Allen18 and Kevin Kearney,19 accused by RAAD and ‘The IRA/New IRA’ 
respectively of dealing drugs in their localities. However, not all of this VDR 
vigilante violence has been targeting external victims. As has been the norm across 
Irish Republican history a significant proportion of the violence has been directed 
inwards, towards current or former comrades within the Irish Republican Movement. 
Carrying on the tradition of the PIRA’s ‘nutting squad,’20 the VDR leaderships have 
attempted to maintain control and discipline within their ranks, through the threat and 
execution of violence for those members deemed to be ‘stepping out of line.’21 
Internal feuds, organisational splits and alleged misconduct has led to the maiming, 
and at times murder, of a number of dissident republicans. The names of Kieran 
Doherty,22 Joe Jones and Eddie Burns23 may not invoke as much public grief and 
sympathy as other VDR victims. However, their deaths and the deaths of others like 
them must also be taken into consideration, if we are to gain an overall understanding 
of the true extent of, and strategic underpinnings associated with, VDR violence. 
Rebranding of Dissidence 
The history of Irish Republicanism has for many been defined by infighting, 
factionalism and splits.24 However, in July 2012 the RIRA and RAAD came together, 
alongside other previously independent dissidents, in a merger. They joined to form 
the new VDR group bearing the self-aggrandising moniker of ‘The IRA.’25 By 
merging, and utilising this title, their intention was clear - to assert themselves as the 
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dominant VDR group. In doing so, they convey the wish to put aside cross-group 
grievances for the sake of refocusing on their end-goal: the achievement of a united 
and independent 32 county socialist Ireland. 
 
Since their emergence they have launched a series of violent attacks, but most notably 
the murder of prison officer David Black in November 2012, and the development of 
a letter-bombing campaign targeting security services and politicians both in Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. As with all acts of terrorism, these were designed to 
carry an additional message beyond their immediate impacts. With the murder of 
David Black, the new group wished to use it as a ‘direct response’ to what they 
characterised as the ‘torture and degradation’ of the dissident prisoners in Maghaberry 
jail and beyond.26 
 
This newly united organisation does not encompass all VDR groups. ONH and CIRA 
retain their independence. CIRA, in fact, have been involved in organisational 
changes of their own. In 2010 they were embroiled in yet another split in their 
paramilitary ranks, as well as within Republican Sinn Féin, their political wing. In 
much the same vein as others before them, this divide has led to a redefinition of 
‘enemy.’ Resultantly, this has seen both sides of the split immersed in on-going 
violent feuds, with little recent evidence of either side’s ability to sustain a persistent 
paramilitary campaign against the security forces.27     
 
It has been proposed, that much of this reorganisation of the VDR community is in 
preparation for the upcoming centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising.28 Across the scope 
of Irish Republicanism, both violent and political, the events of 1916 are deemed to 
mark a turning point in the movement’s history. Padraig Pearse, James Connolly and 
others, are seen as the forefathers of the modern day struggle. Contemporary groups 
employ their names, statements and actions to portray themselves as the heirs to the 
men and women of 1916.  They in turn see Easter 2016 as a historic opportunity to 
replicate the call to arms of Easter 1916. The security forces both north and south of 
border are therefore preparing for an upsurge in VDR activity, in the lead-up to these 
celebrations.29 It is feared that the dissidents will seek to maintain, and potentially 
expand, the Northern Irish campaign while concurrently targeting high profile sites in 
Britain.30   
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Target Selection  
As has been illustrated already, there are a range of people and places targeted by 
VDR groups. But the question remains, how and why do they select these targets? 
Historically our understanding of terrorist targeting has been ideologically centred, 
particularly up to and including the end of the Cold War. The belief has been that the 
ideology of the terrorist will provide the parameters under which a specific target can 
be selected, and the prism through which they view the world.31 Alongside the 
primacy of ideology, it has been believed that the target selection is also influenced by 
the internal organisational dynamics, personalities and a variety of other internal and 
external factors.32 This focus on ideologically and organisationally specific factors has 
at times resulted in a downplaying of the influence that the nature of the targets 
themselves can have in the selection process. 
 
However, with the growing inter-disciplinary nature of terrorism studies, as well as 
the changing nature of the ‘new’ terrorism (largely, but not exclusively associated 
with the events of 11 September, 2001), there has been a recent reassessment, with the 
focus of many analysts now shifting to the targets themselves. Clarke and Newman33 
apply the principles of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), to determine the risks 
posed to potential targets. Their analysis looks at the vulnerability and attractiveness 
of the target. The, awkwardly contrived, acronym of EVIL DONE specifies that 
targets are more susceptible to terrorist attacks when they are exposed, vital, iconic, 
legitimate, destructible, occupied, near and easy. In the application of their model it 
has been stipulated that the proximity, or nearness, to the target is likely to be the 
most important in target selection.34 Clarke and Newman are not alone in applying 
SCP to terrorism. In their analysis of the target-selection by eco-terrorists, 
Gruenewald and colleagues35 applied SCP and found that the proximity of the targets 
also played a significant role. They found that local targets were more likely to be 
attacked than the national symbols. This fits within their finding that the eco-
terrorists, in their research, were more likely to choose ‘easy’ and unprotected targets. 
This localised target selection is also underpinned by the organisational outlook and 
ideology. There is a noted contrast, which shows that these groups differ from 
transnational terrorist organisations that target symbols of national and international 
importance, as a result of their internationally focused aims and ideology.  
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This understanding, provided by the SCP approach, enables us to place a greater 
emphasis on the role of the target in the selection process. However, this can at times 
lead us to a ‘common sense’ approach, to understand what are extremely complex 
socio-political phenomena.36 It should not blind us from the continued importance of 
internal factors, and timing, in the decision-making processes. We must take into 
account an organisation’s capabilities at the time of potential attack, their readiness to 
engage, their expertise and their ability to survive (or willingness to face) an 
inevitable counter-terrorism backlash. These factors and more, including ideology, 
influence the decision-makers in the target selection process. However, as with many 
other issues across terrorism studies there needs to be a respect for heterogeneity, this 
time the heterogeneity of attacks. Gruenewald et al37 demonstrate this by showing the 
difference in target selection, when comparing international and national terrorist 
groups. However, while this heterogenic respect is often demonstrated like this across 
groups, it also needs to be more readily shown within groups as well.38  
The Present Study 
The examination of VDR target selection is carried out here by developing on from 
where our previous analysis left off. In a 2011 publication, we analysed VDR activity 
from 1997 to 2010.39  Here we assess event data in relation to all violent VDR 
activity,40 from January 1st 2007 up to and including August 31st 2015, thus 
encompassing the modern wave of VDR activity. This research is the result of 
analysis of a database of VDR activity. The development of the database was 
originally funded by a research contract from the UK Government. However, post-
2011, since the period of funding has been completed, the maintenance and updating 
of the database has continued independently of external funding. The basic structure 
of this database is described in a previous publication.41 This describes how the 
dataset has been compiled through the analysis of exclusively open source data, e.g. 
media sources, governmental and non-governmental reports. At no stage in the 
development and maintenance of the database did either author utilise, or have access 
to, any level of classified information, nor did we seek it.  
 
Each VDR event is coded across 32 variables.42 For it to be included in the database, 
each event must be verified by at least two independent sources of information. As 
well as adding new information to the database, there are also regular audits on 
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existing data entries to verify the validity of the coded data. Complementing the 
events database there is also a VDR personnel database. In this section, information 
relating to individuals who have been convicted and/or charged of VDR related 
offences are coded across a total of 62 variables. However, the present article is only 
relating to analysis of the events based data.43    
 
Across the majority of analysis of VDR activity the assessment of violence is 
categorised by group.44 However, for the purpose of this article we do not offer such a 
cross-group comparison. The reason for this is that in recent years much of the VDR 
activity has gone unclaimed, by any group. This is an observation that dates back to 
previous analysis of the VDR database,45 and is still apparent in the latest iteration. 
This is not a characteristic unique to VDR groups. It has been witnessed across groups 
and ideologies. Internationally, over half of all terrorist attacks are not credibly 
claimed.46 There is a range of possible reasons for leaving attacks unclaimed. 
However, the rationale for this in relation to VDR attacks requires analysis, which is 
outside the scope of the present paper. 
 
In spite of a lack of a cross-group comparison, we account for the heterogeneity of 
VDR activity. We examine general event data, to assess whether there are any broad 
patterns apparent, before exploring the data in more detail. We firstly analyse data on 
victims and targets of detonated explosives and shootings, before examining fatality 
data from 2007 to mid-2015. In doing so we assess who precisely the victims were, 
before analysing how they were killed. Therefore, five core research questions are 
analysed here: 
 
1. Who or what are the targets of VDR activity? 
2. Who or what are the targets of VDR detonated explosives? 
3. Who or what are the targets of VDR shootings? 
4. Who has been fatally targeted by the VDR groups? 
5. How have those who have died as a result of VDR activity been murdered? 
Overall Trends in VDR Activity 
“So long as Britain persists in its denial of national and democratic rights in Ireland 
the IRA will have to continue.”47 
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The above quote is taken from the origin statement of the newly merged ‘The 
IRA/New IRA’. It contains the central legitimisation for its continued existence, and 
that of any VDR group. They claim that Britain is denying the people of Ireland their 
national and democratic rights. Asserting that claim is central to its justification for 
on-going violence. They present themselves as fighting for the sovereign rights of the 
people of Ireland. However, their aspirations for a united Ireland are in contrast with 
the people of Northern Ireland, who see their future as staying part of the United 
Kingdom. Recent polling data from the Belfast Telegraph/Lucid Talk polls suggests 
that when given the option of Northern Ireland staying part of the United Kingdom, 
immediate Irish unity and Irish unity in 20 years that the majority of those Northern 
Irish citizens polled preferred the option of staying part of the UK. 44% wished to 
stay part of the UK. This was in contrast to 5.7% who preferred Irish unity and 24% 
who wished for Irish unity in 20 years time. The remaining 26.3% stated no opinion. 
Of the Catholics polled only 9.8% wanted Irish unity and a further 39.5% wanted it in 
20 years. However, 20.6% of the Catholics polled wanted to stay part of the United 
Kingdom and the remaining 30.1% had no opinion on the topic.48 Therefore the idea 
that the VDR groups are carrying out the will of the Catholic and nationalist 
populations of Northern Ireland ceases to be valid. However, this does not prevent 
them from maintaining their armed campaign.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, VDR activity saw a peak in frequency most recently in 
2010 after a steady rise from 2007 onwards. However, in the years afterwards there 
has been a clear drop in frequency of activity, right up to the present day. This is 
marked by a minor peak in overall violent activity in 2013. The drop in activity from 
2010 onwards comes after a significant split in the CIRA; a split that the data shows 
led to a deterioration in their activity. It is also significant in the fact that this was in 
the lead up to the merger between the Real IRA, RAAD and others in July 2012. This 
merger would have necessitated a great deal of restructuring and organisation, and 
therefore may have led to this combined deterioration in violence. The minor peak of 
2013 immediately follows this deterioration. One could assess this as the launch of 
the new organisation and through their utility of violence they are communicating 
both inwardly and outwardly that they have both the ability and intention to continue 




Figure 1: Overall VDR Violence from 2007 to August 31 2015  
 
 
Figure 2: Utility of VDR Explosive Devices from 2007 to August 31 2015  
 
These patterns are reflected when we look at the utility of VDR explosive devices, 
both detonated and failed. The major and minor peaks in Figure 2 can yet again be 
seen in 2010 and 2013. However, what is apparent from analysing these data is that 





















2010 (42 detonated; 52 failed) there is much greater discrepancy between the two 
figures in 2013 (16 detonated; 55 failed). This 2013 discrepancy can be the result of a 
number of factors. The explosive devices may have been poorly engineered. The 
police may have had a higher level of intelligence coming from within the groups. Or 
potentially the groups may not have wished for a large number of devices to detonate 
in this year, due to their inability to withstand the counter-VDR backlash, as was 
experienced post-Omagh. The likelihood is that the real reason is a combination of 
factors.  
 
However, if one is to consider the internal organisational decision making 
explanation, with the “The IRA/New IRA” now the dominant actor in VDR activity, 
there may be some logic in this reasoning. While there is nothing within the data to 
indicate this as fact, there is a possibility that in the immediate aftermath of the 
dissident merger that the new organisation wished to demonstrate their intention and 
ability to continue the VDR campaign, and equally to lead the resurgence. This can be 
reflected in the minor peak witnessed in 2013 and depicted in Figure 1. Similarly in 
the aftermath of the merger there is the possibility that the new organisation and its 
leadership did not feel that it was yet organisationally capable of withstanding the 
security services backlash, in the aftermath of a series of ‘successful’ detonations. In 
this regard they may have utilised some of these devices as a form of ‘viable hoax.’ 
 
When a new organisation or merger is launching itself they must immediately 
legitimise their new united existence, to their membership and support. They must 
signal that they have the intention and capacity to launch and, to a certain degree, 
sustain the VDR campaign. This intention can be reflected in the ‘failed’ attacks, 
which can demonstrate the engineering capabilities and expertise within the group 
together with their extensive arsenal, without as much risk. When this is coupled with 
the high profile nature of some of their targets this can assist in justifying the new 
existence to the membership and support, while simultaneously demonstrating the 
threat to the targets of existing and potential attacks. For many these attack ‘failures’ 
may provide an indication of the organisational incapacities of the groups. However, 
if sophisticated bombs are intercepted this can widely publicise the engineering 
capabilities of the new group. In turn it can give the membership faith in the potential 
of the new organisation. 
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This deterioration in overall VDR activity is not just a result of internal VDR 
decision-making, or poor engineering. It is necessary to also recognise the successes 
of the counter-VDR campaign, which has been led by the PSNI in collaboration with 
An Garda Síochána (police of the Republic of Ireland) and the intelligence services. 
However, while the security services have demonstrated their ability to disrupt violent 
activity, through arrests and counter-VDR activity, there is also an acknowledgement 
on both sides of the border that the VDR threat has not necessarily gone away. In 
October 2015 the assistant chief constable of the PSNI Will Kerr acknowledged as 
much by stating that an attack was ‘highly likely’ in Northern Ireland,49 an assertion 
that is supported by the maintenance of the threat of ‘Northern Ireland related 
terrorism in Northern Ireland’ at a severe level ever since September 24th 2010.50 As 
the later sections will demonstrate, when there is deterioration in the frequency of 
overall violent activity this must not lead to complacency in the belief that the threat 
has gone away. A drop in frequency is not necessarily equivalent to a drop in threat. 
This may merely mean an organisational, strategic or tactical change resulting in a 
change of focus and frequency of violence.    
Targets/Victims of VDR Activity 
What follows is an analysis of the victims and targets of VDR violence. The analysis 
first looks at the victims and targets of the overall levels of violence, before focusing 
on differing intentions of shootings and detonated explosives specifically. This serves 
to assess who and what the primary focus of VDR activity has been in recent years. It 
aims to move beyond the rhetoric of the groups and to assess who and what their 
violent activity is actually targeting. Presented in Table 1 is a year-by-year 
representation of the victims and targets of overall VDR activity.  
 
As is apparent from the data the dominant target of VDR violence has been civilian in 
nature. Across the 1,007 violent acts, within the eight and a half years under analysis, 
63.38% of the victims and targets were coded as being civilian. The next biggest 
target groups, by frequency, are police and intelligence personnel and facilities at 
18.1%, criminals at 4.37% and commercial targets at 3.29%. Civilian targets were 
consistently the highest frequency of targets across VDR activity, regularly followed 
in second highest frequency by police and intelligence personnel and facilities. The 
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only years where there was a discrepancy in this was in 2007 and 2008. In 2007 there 
was equal targeting of both groups and in 2008 the targeting of police surpassed that 
of civilians by 12.12%, or four violent events. However, in the years when there was a 
significantly higher level of violent activity from 2009 onwards the majority of targets 
each year were classified as civilian.  
 
The category of civilian targets is a broad category, which includes civilian 
residential, urban and rural areas. With respect to civilian victims these are classified 
as civilian if and when there is no known, stated or symbolic reason to target them 
specifically. When there was an indiscriminate attack, in which the intended target 
was unclear, but those most in danger were civilian this was coded as the targeting of 
civilians. Therefore these figures may not always reflect the organisational intent of 
the attack. But they do reflect our perception of the reality, of the targets most in 
danger. For example there has been a recent surge in VDR bombs being planted 
within residential areas with the intent to draw in and harm police and security 
services responding to the incident. However, this intent is not always clear and the 
people in most direct danger of these attacks are often times the residents, of the areas 
where the bombs have been planted.  
 
Similarly with respect to punishment attacks the VDR groups target many of the 
people because the victims are believed to be criminals, anti-social influences in the 
community or other societal threats. However, the groups do not always publicly 
verify the rationale behind the choice of target for punishment beating. Therefore in 
these cases if the individual targeted does not have any criminal record, or any other 
discerning characteristic to justify their targeting, they were also coded as being 
‘civilian.’ Even with this caveat in place it is clear that those who are most frequently 
in danger of VDR attacks are not the security forces, prison officers, politicians or 
criminals. Similar to the victims of Provisional IRA violence,51 it is the civilian 
population that is most frequently put at risk due to VDR activity. 
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 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Overall 
Civilian 36.36% 30.3% 53.83% 57.98% 64.26% 77.06% 69.94% 77.52% 66.04% 63.38% 
Police and Intelligence 
Personnel and Facilities* 
36.36% 42.42% 16.22% 21.85% 13.49% 12.84% 18.3% 11.24% 20.75% 18.1% 
Police (Family Members)   2.56%  0.52% 0.92%    0.5% 
Army   2.56% 0.84% 0.52% 0.92% 0.65% 2.25% 1.89% 1.09% 
Criminal**  12.12% 11.95% 6.72% 4.15% 0.92% 0.65%   4.37% 
VDR Actors 4.55% 3.03% 0.85% 1.68%    1.12%  0.8% 
Prison Officer      0.92%  2.25%  0.3% 
Transport Infrastructure 9.09% 3.03% 1.71% 3.78% 1.57% 0.92% 4.58% 1.12% 3.77% 2.6% 
Politician 
(Nationalist/Republican) 
4.55% 3.03% 1.71% 0.42% 3.12% 0.92%  1.12% 1.89% 1.39% 
Politician (Unionist)     0.52% 0.92%    0.2% 
Politician (Alliance Party)     0.52%  0.65%   0.2% 
Politician (British 
Government Minister) 
      0.65%   0.1% 
Commercial Target  6.06% 2.55% 3.36% 6.74% 1.83% 2.6% 1.12%  3.29% 
Orange Order Hall   1.71% 0.84% 1.04% 1.83% 1.31% 2.25% 3.77% 1.39% 
	 17
Civil Servant 9.09%  0.85% 0.42% 1.04%  0.65%  1.89% 0.8% 
Court   3.41% 0.84% 1.04%     0.8% 
Loyalist Paramilitary    0.42% 0.52%     0.2% 
Journalist/Publisher     1.04%     0.2% 
Protestant Church    0.42%      0.1% 
n= 22 33 117 238 193 109 153 89 53 N=1007 
*=This includes both current and retired/former police officers 
**=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups 
Table 1: Victims and Targets of Overall VDR Violence
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While the targeting of police, military, criminals and internal members may come as 
no surprise one of the most illuminating results is that 3.29% of VDR targets are 
commercial in nature. When this category of target is analysed further it provides 
more insight into the target selection, by the various organisations. It appears that the 
groups’ target selection may at times be susceptible to societal trends and moral 
panics. This is illustrated specifically in the opening months of 2010. During this 
period there was a growing debate across the island of Ireland about the legality and 
safety of ‘head-shops,’ stores that were selling legal alternatives to banned narcotics. 
This was brought about due to the growing number of teenagers reporting to accident 
and emergency departments of hospitals, due to adverse reactions caused by 
consuming substances bought in the shops. As a result in June 2010 the Irish 
government successfully banned these ‘new psychoactive substances,’ and resultantly 
brought about the end of the vast majority of the stores.52  
 
Against a backdrop of moral panic, the Real IRA and other VDR groups started to 
violently target the owners and premises of these stores. This included, amongst a 
number of other attacks, the Real IRA claiming responsibility for throwing a grenade 
into the home of Dublin-based ‘head-shop’ owner, Jim Bellamy, in mid-2010.53 Many 
understandably report these attacks as a reaction, to the competition posed by the 
‘head-shops’ to the dissident involvement in illegal drug dealing.54 However, it could 
similarly be interpreted as an attempt from the VDR groups to bolster support, within 
the communities they claim to represent. This may explain why a significant 
proportion of this targeting took place in and close to the republican areas of Derry 
city.55 In a similar vein as their targeting of drug dealers, the VDR groups have 
justified these attacks as their attempts to protect the community from the dangers 
posed by these shops.56 The example of these attacks demonstrates that an individual 
attack can, and often does, have a dual purpose. These attacks can equally be 
interpreted as attempts to drive out the competition to their drug-based criminality, 
and contrastingly could be an attempt to gain greater trust from within the 




While the frequency relating to all VDR activity gives us an introductory insight into 
who and what the VDR groups are targeting, it is only when we focus on specific 
forms of violence that we can achieve a more in-depth understanding of the intentions 
of the groups. When the data were analysed to focus solely on the victims and targets 
of detonated explosives the frequency levels change significantly. As can be seen 
when comparing Tables 1 and 2 the percentile frequency of targeting police and 
intelligence personnel and facilities is significantly higher when only detonated 
explosives are considered than it is across the general violent activity data. In the 
general data 18.1% of the VDR attacks target police and intelligences personnel and 
facilities and 0.5% of all attacks target family members of serving police officers. In 
comparison 40.5% and 2.48% respectively of all detonated VDR explosives have 
targeted these two groups. When combined this is higher than any other individual 
victim/target type, including civilian targets. 
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                                                2.48% 
Army      9.09%  2.44%           1.66% 
Criminal**         9.76%           3.31% 
Transport Infrastructure  
33.33% 
                1.65% 
Politician (Unionist)          5.88%         0.83% 
Politician (Alliance Party)                                                            
6.25% 
                    0.83% 
Orange Order Hall                 8.33%   0.83% 
Commercial Target            
12.5% 




          
6.25% 
   
8.33% 
          4.97% 




Court        4.88%          1.65% 
n=  6  8  11  41  17  4  16  12  6 N=121 
*=This includes both current and retired/former police officers 
**=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups 
Table 2: Victims and Targets of Detonated VDR Explosives 
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These data, unsurprisingly, suggests that the VDR groups aim to cause the most 
significant harm to the police and intelligence forces, above all other potential targets 
or victims within the Northern Irish state. If it was purely intent which taken into 
consideration, when coding these event data, it would be likely to show that the 
targeting of police and intelligence personnel and facilities would have been even 
higher. However, without a subsequent statement of intent and purpose after each 
attack it is impossible to reliably code for intent in relation to all activity.  
 
Shootings 
The VDR groups, alongside their targeting of the security services and institutions of 
the state, have also persisted in targeting those they classify as criminal actors. This 
has mainly included local drug dealers, from the republican and nationalist areas of 
Northern Ireland. However, as can be seen from the data in Table 2 these criminals 
are not generally targeted using explosive devices. There are of course exceptions to 
this, as can be seen with the utility of pipe bombs by RAAD in 2010 to target people 
they claimed to be drug dealers.57 These attacks account for 9.76% of all detonated 
explosives in 2010. However, it is more common for perceived criminals to be 
targeted by shootings. Table 3 shows that 17.13% of all shootings target individuals 
who are known to be, or perceived to be, criminals. This is in comparison to a 3.31% 
targeting with detonated explosives. The true figure of criminal and anti-social 
targeting will be supplemented from the 59.99% targeting of civilian, many of whom 
may be perceived to be criminals or anti-social entities by the violent dissidents. 
However, this is not readily communicated through a claim of responsibility or 
explanation of attack. Resultantly they have been coded as being ‘civilian.’ 
 
In contrast to the 40.5% of detonated explosives that target police and intelligence 
personnel and facilities, only 15.42% of all shootings have been directed at them. 
However, while the frequency of the act is low the 2009 murders of Constable 
Stephen Carroll and British soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar have 
demonstrated the potential, and intended, lethality of some of these attacks.  
 
VDR Fatalities 
The VDR groups promote themselves as a paramilitaries fighting against the forces of 
the British state. However, this is not abundantly apparent, when their shooting and 
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fatality figures are analysed. The majority of their victims can more readily be 
classified, or externally promoted as, criminals. In total there have been 21 confirmed 
VDR related fatalities since 2007. Close to half (10) of these have been classified as 
being criminal. Following that almost a quarter (5) were either internal members or 
rival VDR actors. When the figures of fatalities of police officers, British soldiers and 
prison officers are combined it only then equals the number of internal or rival VDR 
actors who have been murdered by these groups, since 2007. With the exception of 
Ronan Kerr each of those individuals who have been murdered in a VDR attack since 





 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Overall 
Civilian 42.87% 75% 63.26% 58.07% 71.43% 42.86% 25% 50% 100% 59.99% 
Police and Intelligence 
Personnel*  
28.57%  8.16% 17.74% 7.14% 28.57% 62.5% 25%  15.42% 
Police (Family Members)   2.04%       0.57% 
Prison Officer      14.29%    0.57% 
Army   2.04%       0.57% 
Criminal**  12.5% 22.44% 17.74% 17.85% 14.29% 12.5%   17.13% 
Politician 
(Nationalist/Republican) 
14.29%         0.57% 
Commercial Target    1.61%      0.57% 
Court   2.04%       0.57% 
VDR Actors  14.29% 12.5%  4.83%    25%  3.42% 
Journalist/Publisher     3.57%     0.57% 
n= 7 8 49 62 28 7 8 4 2 N=175 
*=This includes both current and retired/former police officers 
**=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups 












The perception of power and control is clearly important to the VDR groups. For 
them to be able to survive, a pre-requisite to achieving any degree of ‘success’,58 they 
believe that they must first of all gain the support from, and control of, their own 
communities. There are two core reasons as to why fellow VDR actors are targeted. 
They are perceived to be either an internal or an external threat. These threats may be 
towards the leadership, individual members or the organisation as a whole. In a post-
split environment the perception of enemy often changes. Those who were once 
regarded as comrades and allies are now perceived to be an organisational and 
strategic threat. This not only accounts for the VDR actors being targeted but also for 
the 1.39% of all VDR activity that was directed towards republican or nationalist 
politicians.  
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Overall 
Civilian     1     1 
Police    1  1     2 
Prison 
Officer 
     1    1 
Army   2       2 
Criminal*   1 5  2 2   10 
VDR 
Actors 
2 1  1    1  5 
n= 2 1 4 6 2 3 2 1 0 21 
*=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals 
by the VDR groups 
Table 4: Known VDR Fatalities 
 
Target Decision-Making: Bombings versus Shootings 
In assessing these data we must question why there is such a difference between the 
targets of shootings and detonated explosives? The terrorist actor must decide, and 
assess, who or what they are targeting, why they are targeting this, what message they 
are aiming to portray, who the broader audience to this attack are and what are the 
chances of them being apprehended. These, and many other, factors contribute to their 
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decision-making, and can therefore impinge on the choices made in relation to violent 
methodology.      
   
When targeting the police and security forces, they must consider a range of issues. 
The message that is intended as being portrayed through the targeting of the police is 
a national one. It aims to portray the groups as having the capacity to challenge the 
supremacy of an ‘occupying force.’ This is a message directed both externally and 
internally. The police and their facilities are among the most highly protected targets 
available. By targeting a police officer or their facilities it poses the greatest risk of 
arrest. Under the EVIL DONE model59 the targets are vital, iconic and legitimate. 
However, they are not easy. Therefore, it is proposed that these factors lead the 
decision-makers to more regularly decide that an explosive device is the best tactic to 
use, when targeting police. A ‘successful’ bomb can send a message both to the police 
and to internal members that the organisation has the intent and capability to threaten 
the police.  
 
One of the most important factors for the perpetrators to consider is the possibility of 
arrest. The contrast here is clear, a shooter needs to be in closer proximity to his or her 
target than someone who plants a bomb. This therefore provides greater possibility of 
a shooter being arrested at the scene of a crime. They will always need to be there, at 
the time of attack. In contrast the person who plants the bomb will not always be in 
the proximity at the point of detonation. They may not even be within the same town, 
county or country. The targeting of police officers and facilities requires police 
officers to be present at the point of attack. This resultantly brings with it a higher risk 
of arrest. 
 
Reducing the possibility of detection or arrest may in turn be an integral part of the 
decision-making process, which has led to the proliferation of the utility of both letter 
and proxy bombs in the recent past. Both of these have seen a recent return to the 
streets of Northern Ireland. As can be seen from data presented in Table 5 from 2012 
onwards there has been a gradual return of the letter and parcel bomb, as a tactic of 
choice. This has been especially utilised when the groups have aimed to target high 
profile individuals. These targets have included, among others, the then Chief 
Constable of the PSNI Matt Baggott and the Secretary for State for Northern Ireland 
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Theresa Villiers both in 2013, and, as was mentioned at the beginning of this article, 
the parcel bomb targeting Palace Barracks in 2015. This has also seen Irish terrorism 
return to Great Britain, with the targeting of seven separate Army recruitment offices 
in England with letter bombs in early 2014. In parallel to this, there has been the re-
emergence of the proxy bombs where innocent civilians have been forced to drive 
bombs to the intended targets. This tactic saw a return in 2013 and 2014. The primary 
target for the proxies has been the Strand Road Police Station in Derry, a station that 
has consistently been targeted across this current wave of violence. Recent years has 
seen the tactic of choice for attacking this station, attempted mortar bombings, 
complemented by the utility of proxy attacks. 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 Overall 
Civilian 1 1 1  3 
Prison Officer   2  2 
Police and Intelligence Personnel 
and Facilities 
 3  2 5 
Politician (British Government 
Minister) 
 1   1 
Army (Recruitment Offices)   7  7 
Civil Servant  1   1 
Overall 1 6 10 2 19 
Table 5: Targets of Letter Bombs (Detonated and Undetonated) 
 
By using both letter and proxy bombings, the groups place a further barrier between 
themselves and the risk of arrest. By forcing innocent civilians to deliver the bombs, 
they are providing themselves with an extra layer of protection. Unlike a bomb that 
they plant themselves, they do not even have to attend the scene of attack when the 
explosive is delivered. Due to high risk in attacking these prominent targets the 
traditional form of attack may have been deemed to require adjustment. The 
continued use of the proxy bombing to target the Strand Road Station may also 
indicate a localisation of tactics. It may demonstrate that the choices of targets and 
methods are more readily made at a local brigade level, rather than at national 
leadership. This would in turn also reflect the importance of the proximity of attackers 
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to target, as is emphasised by Newman and Hsu.60 This requires further analysis that 
focuses more on the locality of violence. However, it does emphasise the necessity of 
local as well as national counter-VDR strategies. 
 
The rationalisation as to why detonated explosives more readily target the security 
forces provides us with a generalizable understanding of the decision-making process. 
However, when we bring the factors of timing and organisational change into 
consideration this can periodically alter the process. As has already been seen the re-
launch of the VDR campaign saw a steady rise in activity from 2007 to 2010. We also 
witnessed a minor peak in activity in the aftermath of the development of the ‘The 
IRA/New IRA.’ It is important that we don’t just look at the frequency of events but 
also the nature and intent of the attacks. 
 
In March 2009 as the reigniting of the VDR campaign was gaining momentum within 
two days of each other the RIRA murdered soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick 
Azimkar and the CIRA killed PSNI officer Stephen Carroll. 61 In November 2012, 
just over three months after the ‘The IRA/New IRA’ announced their establishment; 
they murdered prison officer David Black.  Each of these men was shot. While 
targeting members of the security services was not extraordinary the choice of 
weapons in each of these murders went against the norm, for these forms of victims. It 
is proposed here that this was a deliberate choice. Both the VDR operatives of 2009 
and the newly merged group of 2012 needed to make a statement of intent. They 
needed to show their membership and support, as well as their enemies, that their new 
campaigns were worth following and fearing. Through these attacks they were saying 
that they were going to do things differently, and bring the fight directly to the 
‘British oppressor.’ At times like these the risk of arrest was being outweighed by the 
potential to ‘successfully’ launch a new campaign.62    
 
When the targeting of high profile state actors is compared to the decision-making 
process in targeting criminals, the results are notably different. In contrast to the 
intended national message of the targeting of police, when attacking criminals the 
groups’ intended messages are much more locally directed. This is the dichotomy that 
Gruenewald et al63 witnessed across groups. However, it is observed here within 
groups. The groups wish to illustrate the power and control, which they have over 
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specific communities in which they are operating. Each of the criminal targets 
operated within republican areas. This in turn demonstrates the localisation of the 
groups’ message. The localised message incentivises the perpetrators to have their 
organisational identity, and at times their individual identity, known to the criminals 
and affiliates. By revealing this identity this allows the perpetrators to portray the 
message that they are in control. It shows the criminals who the threat is coming from. 
By having the reduced risk of arrest, it enables them to produce a more personalised 
threat to the criminals. 
 
This desire for identification of responsibility is not only observed in the choice of 
shooting as a method, but can also be seen during the supremacy of RAAD in Derry 
and Donegal between 2009 and 2011. The pattern within VDR activity at this time 
was to leave the majority of attacks unclaimed. However, RAAD provided an 
anomaly. They not only let their identity be known to their immediate victims, but 
they regularly acknowledged their responsibility for attacks, and posed threats of 
future attacks, within the local Derry Journal newspaper.64 Alongside the attacks 
themselves, this was their way of promoting their desired control and power of the 
local Republican areas. 
 
The targeting of criminals provides a reduced risk of arrest. Due to the very nature of 
the chosen targets, they are less inclined to report the crime due to the rationale for 
their targeting. By reporting to the police that you were a victim of such an attack, one 
is not only identifying themselves as a perceived criminal but they are also placing 
themselves, their family and affiliates at risk of future attacks. Overall this sends an 
intended message of local power and control. This is in contrast to their message 
when targeting the security and symbols of the state. In those actions they are 
portraying themselves as the ‘put-upon’ minority intent on gaining national power.  
Conclusions 
The centenary of the 1916 Rising will represent a time of celebration for the Irish 
people. It provides an opportunity to reflect, on the evolution of the country and the 
island as a whole. However, while the majority will be utilising this centenary to 
promote positivity, there are a small few who will attempt to manipulate it to 
legitimise their retention of some of the darker aspects of Irish life; namely 
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paramilitary and terrorist activity. The organisational changes, threatening statements 
and, most importantly, paramilitary activity demonstrates that these violent dissident 
republicans are intent on sustaining and increasing the terrorist threat they pose across 
the island of Ireland and Great Britain. 
 
Their rhetoric speaks of retaining a military presence against a British ‘occupying 
force.’ This has manifested in the terrorist targeting of the police, intelligence services 
and the British Army, primarily through the use of explosive devices. However, theirs 
is a multi-layered strategy. Alongside their targeting to the auspices of the state, the 
VDR groups provide a more persistent threat to the civilian population of Northern 
Ireland. Civilian targets have been the ones most commonly attacked in recent years. 
This is further compounded with the terrorists’ attempts to forcefully acquire power 
and control, within republican areas of Belfast and Derry, through their at times lethal 
form of vigilante ‘justice,’ against those they have personally defined as ‘criminals.’ 
 
What our analysis has aimed to show are the results of the VDR decision-making 
process, not just in relation to target selection but also in the choice of method of 
attack. The study has shown that there are contrasting methods used, dependent on the 
victim or target selected. Even though the majority of general VDR attacks are 
directed against civilian targets, distantly followed by the police and intelligence 
services, when we focus purely on detonated explosives the result is quite different. 
When utilising this method of attack security related targets are more likely to be the 
focus. However, when the concentration is on shootings, civilian and criminal targets 
are both more likely than the security services to be the intended victim.  
 
Central to this is the disparity of the aims in targeting both sets of victims. The 
targeting of the security services forms part of the national organisational strategy of 
the groups. The intent of this target selection is to provide both internal members and 
external audiences with the impression that the groups are posing a threat to the 
security apparatus of an ‘occupying regime.’ However, the targeting of civilians and 
perceived criminals derives from the local organisational strategies of achieving 
power and control in the Republican areas of Northern Ireland. The chosen modus 
operandi to attack these targets reflects the rationale behind the target selection, but 
also the opportunities provided by the targets themselves. With this considered it is 
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believed that the SCP approach, as well as an ideology centric view, working in 
parallel can assist in our understanding of the target selection.  
 
The understanding gained from this analysis, can provide the information necessary 
for greater preparedness to withstand potential future attacks. However, the 
information should also be utilised by those engaging in any form of counter-narrative 
against the VDR groups. These groups are continuously attempting to portray 
themselves as victims, and their ‘struggle’ as legitimate. In doing so they attempt to 
depict the PSNI and security services as being central to an oppressive regime. It is a 
continuous strategy to try and assign blame to the police for anyone who may be a 
casualty of their attacks. To their supporters they wish to lay blame at the door of the 
police tactics, claiming that they, the police, continuously put the civilians in harm’s 
way in order to protect themselves.  
 
"This tactic by the PSNI is very deliberate and we take this opportunity to 
advise all members of our community, including community workers, to 
refuse in any and all circumstances any requests from the PSNI or local 
politicians to do the bidding of the PSNI in this or any other way…We state 
categorically that any injury or death caused by the PSNI tactics will be 
solely their responsibility."65 
 
This is an attempt to simultaneously gain support for their legitimacy and discourage 
any trust in the police. Perhaps, the most effective way of countering this message is 
through the demonstration of data, which show that it is the VDR groups, rather than 
the police, who are putting civilians in harm’s way. This is both through the direct 
targeting of civilians with their attacks and the forced use of civilians to deliver their 
bombs to the intended target.  
 
For this wider analysis to have further significance for those wishing to counter the 
VDR threat, it is important that any devised strategy must incorporate appropriately 
tailored national and local strategies. There needs to be an appreciation of the 
diversity of tactics, targets and rationale. Further analysis is therefore required to 
assess the influence of regional factors on the choice of victims, targets and methods. 
This regional appreciation, coupled with the analysis presented here can and will 
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assist in the preparedness for countering the genuine VDR threat. Future research 
needs to also take the timing of attacks into greater consideration, when assessing 
target selection. This could potentially affect the exposure, occupation and ease of 
targeting and therefore influence the target selection if one is to apply the EVIL 
DONE model.66  
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